

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**IF CIVILIAN LEADERS OVERRULE MILITARY LEADERS AND
DIRECT THEM TO ELIMINATE A DIVISION, WHAT TYPE OF
DIVISION SHOULD BE CUT: ARMY HEAVY OR MARINE?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This paper addresses the developing political forces and budgetary issues that may lead civilian leaders to overrule the objections of senior military leaders and direct them to eliminate a division -- either an Army heavy or a Marine division. Should this happen, the Department of Defense (DoD) should eliminate a Marine division, not an Army heavy division. (This paper does not address whether the DoD should cut an Army light division). This recommendation includes a detailed analysis of the following arguments. First, if all of the Marine Corps's infantry regiments were employed simultaneously, approximately three of the Marine Corps's eight regiments could neither embark aboard amphibious shipping nor marry up with maritime pre-positioned squadron (MPSRON) equipment in a benign environment. Second, the Army heavy division with its supporting elements including its corps slice and supporting air force possesses superior fire power both direct and indirect, compared to the Marine division and its supporting forces found in the Marine Expeditionary Force. Third, in a rapid power projection military, greater reliance on reserve forces cannot substitute adequately for active forces.

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Will the Army bear the majority of the next stage of force structure cuts? It certainly seems so. In carrying out the latest defense study, the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense (DoD) is reviewing the means and ways of achieving its strategic ends. According to one account, the DoD “is weighing the elimination of two active Army divisions.” Additionally, a “senior officer said the Army will lose at least two of its 10 active divisions.”¹ While Air Force and Navy units also may be eliminated, Marine force structure cuts go unmentioned.² General Ronald R. Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, “favors a new strategy. U.S. forces should be capable of winning one major conflict, a conflict requiring half of those forces with enough left over to handle two peacekeeping or humanitarian operations.”³ Instead of a two nearly simultaneous major regional conflict (MRC) force-sizing criterion, the General favors maintenance of sufficient forces to successfully conduct one MRC, one-half MRC, and two smaller scale contingencies (SSCs).⁴ Other Pentagon officials concur. They believe that declining budgets will “force them to abandon the policy of being able to fight two wars at once, to one of being able to fight one war while dealing with a contingency other than war.”⁵ This is a significant policy shift. The commanders-in-chief (CINCs) for the regions most likely to contain MRCs favor the allocation of more heavy divisions with the greater combat power of tanks, Bradleys, and multiple launched rocket systems, rather than light infantry divisions with leg-powered infantrymen and towed artillery. Yet, the proposed change in the force-sizing criterion clearly favors retaining light, not heavy ground forces. The Army may well lose one to two active heavy divisions.

After reviewing the completed defense study, civilian leaders may ultimately direct the DoD to cut ground force structure—most likely to eliminate a division-sized unit or units. If this occurs, the DoD should cut a Marine division before it eliminates an Army heavy division. Cutting **any** of the six active Army heavy divisions would put the United States at grave risk with respect to its ability to successfully prosecute two nearly simultaneous MRCs.

This study begins with a review of the economic and political trends likely to lead civilian leaders to direct the U.S. military to reduce ground force structure. Focusing on our current force's capabilities to conduct sustained ground combat operations, this study compares and contrasts Army and Marine roles, missions, and force structure. The study then proposes that if civilian leaders require the DoD to cut ground force structure, that the Pentagon first eliminate a Marine division before it cuts an Army heavy division. Also, the study analyzes the likely impacts on military strategy if the DoD eliminates Army heavy force structure, with particular attention to the situation on the Korean peninsula. Finally, the study analyzes whether National Guard heavy units could adequately substitute for an eliminated Army heavy division.

Regarding risk, this study does not address whether the United States assumes grave risk if the DoD were to cut a Marine division. The study does show, however, that the nation would assume relatively greater risk if an Army heavy division were eliminated rather than a Marine division.

This study does not compare and contrast Marine force structure with Army light force structure in detail. Yet a superficial analysis does offer useful insights. Originally designed to be deployable by as few as 500 aircraft sorties, an Army light division can be

transported to any region of the world, not just littoral regions.⁶ On the other hand, the Marines can effectively argue that Marine divisions are more flexible than Army light divisions. Equipped with tank, light armored reconnaissance, and amphibious assault battalions, the Marine division can easily task organize to bring as few or as many of its armored assets as are necessary. “Marine divisions and aircraft wings are neither heavy nor light nor specialized for a particular geographic region. They are general purpose organizations specialized for lodgment; combat capabilities are attached or detached, as required by the situation.”⁷ Besides fighting as effectively as an Army light division on difficult terrain or in an urban environment, the Marine division can fight on open terrain more effectively than an Army light division. This point of comparison could be decisive in a decision about whether to eliminate an Army light division or a Marine division. But decision-makers will consider other critical factors.

For example, cutting an Army light division offers significantly smaller savings than the much larger savings that would be generated by eliminating an Army heavy division or a Marine division.⁸ Because of their substantial cost differential, therefore, this study does not assess elimination of a light division vice a Marine division. While threat or capabilities should drive strategy, strategists cannot completely ignore the budgetary forces—the forces that arguably are driving the QDR process. Economic issues loom large in the political rationale for force structure cuts.

Since the erection of the Iron Curtain by the Soviet Union, the United States has spent enormous sums of taxpayer dollars on national security. The federal government funded a highly capable military force structure to counter the Soviet threat. At the same time, Congress enacted steadily growing entitlement programs for the poor and middle

classes. In fact, the federal government has had only eight balanced budgets in the past 50 years.⁹ Finally the Berlin Wall “fell” in 1989, quickly followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, allowing for reductions in the DoD budget. However, entitlement spending did not taper off. It continued to grow as a percentage of federal spending.¹⁰ Even with the changes recently enacted to control the growth of the welfare system, the increase in other entitlement programs like Medicare ensures continued deficit spending.¹¹

According to the President's proposed fiscal year 1998 budget, federal spending includes 15% for interest payments on the national debt, 15% for defense spending, 53% for entitlements, and 17% for other-than-defense discretionary spending.¹² (It is interesting to note that the American tax-payer provides the same amount of money for interest on the national debt as he does for national defense.) To balance the budget, the government may cut any of these categories except interest payments.

Yet few civilian leaders appear willing to cut the rate of growth in entitlement spending to balance the budget. During the 1996 electoral campaign, political leaders who proposed reductions in the growth of federal entitlements like Medicare from more than 10 percent per year to 7 percent (a savings of \$158 billion) suffered at the polls.¹³ Shortly after the election, a senior Congressional leader asked for administration support to endorse reducing the consumer price index (CPI) for Social Security recipients by one percent.¹⁴ However, the President's and the Congress's lack of support make it unlikely that this proposal will be approved.¹⁵ More recently, the release of the President's fiscal year 1998 budget supposedly included a proposal for significant reductions in the rate of growth of entitlement spending for Medicare (a savings of \$124 billion).¹⁶ However, in

truth, this proposal merely charges \$55 billion in home-health-care expenses against general revenues instead of Medicare funds, producing a real savings of only \$69 billion.¹⁷ Furthermore, the proposed budget included new entitlement spending to help finance middle class children through their first two years of college.¹⁸

Other adjustments that could reduce the rate of growth of entitlement spending include raising the eligibility age for social security commensurate with the increasing life-span of Americans, establishing means testing for social security benefits, and eliminating Medicare and Medicaid fraud, waste, and abuse. In fact, Congress has already legislated raising the Social Security eligibility age from 65 to 67 over a 24 year period starting in 2003.¹⁹ Implementing this process any sooner is unlikely. Middle-aged people have already made decisions for their retirement. Changing the social security eligibility age slowly provides time for younger age groups who have yet to arrange their retirement plans. As for “means testing” of social security benefits, Kingson and Schulz call it “a poor idea.”²⁰ Social Security is not a tax. It is an earned right and centers on two principles: adequacy and equity.²¹ “[H]igh-income contributors get higher monthly benefits, although they receive a rate of return on their payroll tax contributions that is roughly one-half of what low-income workers receive.”²² Enacting a means-tested program will diminish the distinction between social insurance and welfare causing them to merge—which could erode the political support of the affluent, who will view it as unfair.²³ In addition, means testing will likely discourage saving and working during retirement.²⁴ Finally, achieving significant savings requires means testing beginning well below the \$100,000 income level, “dipping to levels that most people consider middle-income.”²⁵ As for medical savings accounts, one Senator resisted passage

of this legislation that others believe offers great promise to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.²⁶ However, Congress finally eked out a test program that began 1 January 1997.²⁷ Despite this single attempt to reduce the rate of growth in entitlement spending (yet unproven), it appears that there is little political will to go any further.

So budgetary politics reveal that our elected officials have only two choices to realistically eliminate the deficit: cutting defense spending and/or other-than-defense discretionary spending. Both categories have already sustained many cuts over the years, while entitlement spending has continued to squeeze them.

Despite the change in the thinking among the military and civilian leadership from a threat-based to a capabilities-based force structure, many Americans continue to think in terms of a threat-based force structure. They believe that force structure can be justified only by a foreign threat to U.S. security or interests. However, replacing the Soviet menace with a compelling threat poses a difficult problem for American military strategists. No other nation is currently a peer or a near-peer military competitor to the United States. Naturally, this new found “comfort zone” leads to growing demands for reductions in defense spending, such as Lawrence J. Korb’s attack against the “Overstuffed Armed Forces.”²⁸ American civilian leaders realize this as they struggle to satisfy public demands to balance the federal budget. Thus the disappearance of the Soviet threat makes defense spending an easy target.

Recognizing the political pressure to cut defense spending in 1990, DoD leaders cut across all four categories of Pentagon spending: operations and maintenance, force structure, infrastructure, and procurement. But the cuts fell primarily across the latter three categories. The DoD reduced force structure in two stages: first under the Base

Force concept and then under the Bottom-up Review (BUR). Army divisions plunged from 18 active and 10 reserve to 10 and 8, respectively.²⁹ In fact, the Army decreased almost 40% in total force structure and 36% in manpower.³⁰ Air Force wings fell from 24 active and 12 reserve to 13 and 7, respectively.³¹ Naval ships will have decreased from nearly 600 to 346 by 1999.³² Only Marine Corps force structure has been spared substantial cuts, sustaining a reduction of 11%.³³ In fact, before the drawdown, the Marines represented 21% of the total U.S. ground forces; now they represent 26%.³⁴

Working through the Base Re-alignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) process, Congress approved reductions in infrastructure (i.e., bases) by 21%.³⁵ “[F]urther cuts in infrastructure—through privatization, outsourcing, and perhaps another round of base closures—offer a lucrative source of savings.”³⁶ Though some of these options may be acceptable, civilian leaders appear reluctant to match the almost 40% reduction in force structure with deeper infrastructure cuts.³⁷ Congressional leaders fully realize that base closures translate into lost jobs. In any event, several years would elapse before any substantial savings are realized.³⁸ Experience has shown that infrastructure reductions require a down payment in spending.³⁹ Base closures require environmental cleanup of contaminated groundwater and unexploded ordnance, more costly than originally projected.⁴⁰ The last effort (BRAC ‘95) was supposed to be “the Mother of all base closings.”⁴¹ However, as early as January 1995, political pressure reduced the size of that BRAC effort.⁴² In any event, Congress has not yet authorized the next round of base closures.⁴³ Thus it is highly unlikely that DoD will receive any infrastructure funding (or budgetary) relief in the near future.

By cutting and delaying modernization and equipment recapitalization, DoD reduced the procurement funding category the most. Proposed research and development (R&D) spending of \$4.4 billion for the Army in fiscal year 1996 was “the lowest R&D level (in constant FY 95 dollars) since 1958.”⁴⁴ In fact, “while the Army’s overall buying power from fiscal 1990 to fiscal 1995 dropped 33 percent, the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) budget plummeted 48 percent.”⁴⁵ As a result, “defense spending accounts for the lowest percentage of gross national product since before Pearl Harbor.”⁴⁶ That Military Personnel and Operations and Maintenance accounts for almost 80% of Army spending underscores the fact that procurement spending also is at its lowest percentage of gross national product since prior to World War II.⁴⁷ While funding levels for dramatically reduced procurement may not affect military posture in the near-term, it threatens to leave the United States vulnerable to obsolescence in the mid- to long-term. One example is the need for a replacement fleet of tactical wheeled vehicles. “[T]he fleet won’t start to get healthy until about 2010.”⁴⁸ Due to low procurement, the United States may not be able to achieve its strategic military ends should a substantially more dangerous threat emerge in the 21st century. This risk leads to the conclusion that the DoD can no longer delay procurement funding. The DoD must begin to increase procurement funding levels to avoid disastrously low readiness in the mid- to long-term. No matter how much money is spent on readiness, if modern equipment is not fielded, the Army’s forces eventually risk obsolescence. Since future reductions in the defense budget cannot be reasonably absorbed by the procurement account, then force structure cuts become more likely.

Establishing a strategic construct for comparing and contrasting Army and Marine force structure requires that several terms be defined to ensure that the reader clearly understands the comparison. Designing a force development strategy that considers force structure funding, the number and mix of Army light and heavy divisions and Marine divisions, and the nation's objectives can best be understood in the context of the ends, ways, and means of our National Military Strategy. Force structure funding provides the strategic means. The number and mix of Army light and heavy divisions and Marine divisions are the strategic ways. The nation's strategic objectives become the strategic ends that the nation's leaders must achieve to protect our national security and to preserve our national interests. DoD must establish the appropriate number and mix of Army light and heavy divisions and Marine divisions (ways) by using force structure funding (means) to achieve the strategic objectives (ends). Proper use of this analytical framework of ends, ways, and means is crucial to national security during times of limited means. Failure to align these components realistically may jeopardize the nation's security.

The term "heavy force structure" includes Army armored and mechanized divisions. The Army currently fields six of these divisions in the active component.⁴⁹ Also, heavy force structure can include Marine tank battalions and light-armored-reconnaissance (LAR) battalions, consisting of light armored vehicles (LAVs). However, the amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) must be excluded because it has no armor piercing capability beyond that provided by the M2 (50 caliber) machine gun.⁵⁰ Also, its armor protection ranges between 30 to 45mm, hardly sufficient to defeat much more than 7.62mm rounds.⁵¹

The term “Marine division” includes all of its organic equipment and is comparable to the term, “Army heavy division.” The term “Marine Expeditionary Force” (MEF) includes the Ground Combat Element (normally one Marine division), the Aviation Command Element (normally one Marine Aircraft Wing), and the Combat Service Support Element (the Force Service Support Element) and 60 days of supplies.⁵² The MEF is analogous to the Army “heavy division, its slice, and its supporting air forces.” The “heavy division and its slice” include an Army heavy division and elements from its supporting corps units: aviation, artillery, air defense, civil affairs, engineer, chemical, military intelligence, military police, signal, and the corps support command.⁵³ In addition, the U.S. Air Force supports the heavy division.

Analyzing Marine force structure requires an understanding of Marine Corps roles and missions. Marines conduct forcible entry operations from naval amphibious shipping.⁵⁴ These operations play a major role at the beginning of the lodgment phase of an operation.⁵⁵ In addition, Marines deploy troops by Air Force or Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft to marry up with equipment off-loaded from Maritime Pre-positioned Squadron (MPSRON) ships. This capability is similar to the Army War Reserve (AWR)-3 / Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA) program.⁵⁶ Marines also perform the mission of strategic or theater reserve.⁵⁷ Finally, the Marines provide enabling forces and amphibious reserves to threaten an enemy's flank or reserve.⁵⁸ In summary, Marines conduct expeditionary operations in littoral regions.

As the lodgment is established, Marine amphibious forces are augmented by Marine forces married up with their maritime prepositioned force (MPF) equipment. Similarly, some Army heavy forces marry up with their pre-positioned equipment, either

land-based AWR such as AWR-2 in Europe or AWR-3/APA equipment.⁵⁹ Then remaining Army heavy forces deploy into theater and assume control of the fight, and the Marines can re-deploy from the theater of operations. If necessary and if supported by the Army, Marines can conduct decisive, sustained ground combat operations alongside the Army.

A valid comparison of Army and Marine force structure makes best sense in a context where both forces conduct similar combat operations, such as sustained ground combat operations. If there are valid requirements for the Marines to simultaneously employ all of its ground combat force structure in amphibious operations, the argument of this paper becomes moot. Similarly, if Marine forces, not needed to conduct amphibious operations, could marry up with MPF equipment and arrive in theater ready to fight as efficaciously and before the Army's later arriving non-on-site AWR or non-AWR-3/APA supported ground forces, then the argument of this paper is moot. However, if any portion of the Marines' force structure is not required either to conduct amphibious operations or simultaneously to marry up with MPF equipment delivered by MPSRON shipping, then these later arriving Marines would conduct sustained ground combat operations. These operations are no different from operations performed by later arriving Army non-AWR heavy forces. Thus a comparison of this later arriving Marine force structure with the Army's later arriving non-AWR heavy force structure is valid. For this reason, DoD should specifically compare and contrast the lethality, mobility, and armored protection of Marine force structure with Army heavy force structure.

The Marines may conduct forcible entry operations organized in Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) from naval amphibious ships.⁶⁰ The Navy's amphibious

fleet totals only 36 ships, not including the two command ships, the Blue Ridge and Mt. Whitney.⁶¹ This number is highly unlikely to increase in this era of severe budget constraints. Thirty-six amphibious ships are not capable of simultaneously transporting all three Marine Corps MEFs; in fact, they cannot even embark a full MEF, approximately three Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) equivalents.⁶² Instead, the current 36-amphibious-ship fleet, which still includes the older LPDs and LSDs, will be capable of lifting only two MEB equivalents through 2003.⁶³ With the commissioning of the newer and more capable LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious ships, the amphibious fleet will achieve the capability of lifting 2.5 MEB equivalents by 2009.⁶⁴

Employing all 36 amphibious ships to lift 2.5 MEB equivalents would require the Navy to move its entire amphibious fleet into one theater of operations. Besides the disadvantage in terms of the time required to move all 36 ships into one theater, the likelihood that they all would be available is doubtful (because of wide dispersal, shipyard repair, and other factors). Thus the Navy is probably capable of embarking rapidly at most two MEB equivalents.

This incongruity between Marine force structure and the Navy's amphibious fleet becomes more pronounced in view of the changes in force structure during the past decade. While the Navy decreased the size of its amphibious fleet by 40% from 60 to 36 ships between 1989 and 1996, the Marine Corps cut only 21,000 Marines, an 11% reduction of the Marine Corps.⁶⁵ This may help explain why the Marines have more force structure than can either embark aboard naval amphibious ships or marry up with MPF equipment from MPSRONs.

Besides embarking Marine forces aboard amphibious shipping, the Marines can deploy approximately three MEB equivalents using the three MPSRONs.⁶⁶ But MPSRON shipping, like AWR-3/APA, cannot be used for forcible-entry operations. It requires a benign environment for off-loading equipment. In conclusion, the Marines can amphibiously lift two MEB equivalents for the conduct of forcible entry operations and marry up three MEB equivalents with MPSRONs in a benign environment. This number of MEB equivalents employs only five of the eight infantry regiments currently structured in the active Marine Corps.⁶⁷ The BUR appears to support this analysis for major regional conflicts, including option four: “winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs plus conduct smaller operations.”⁶⁸ While option four would have kept Army structure at 12 active divisions, the Marines are listed with only five active brigades.⁶⁹ If the Marines intended to employ only five regiments in those five brigades in each of the four likely scenarios, then why does the military force structure retain an additional three Marine infantry regiments?

The remaining three active Marine regiments with associated units and supplies would flow into the theater of operations and become ready for combat operations no sooner than Army non-AWR heavy forces. Thus the CINC is likely to prioritize the arrival of these remaining three Marine regiments with Army non-AWR heavy forces in a sequence that offers the most lethal combat power, mobility, and armored protection during the conduct of sustained ground combat operations. Thus it is reasonable for the DoD to compare those remaining three Marine regiments and their associated air, combat support, and service support units to Army non-AWR prepositioned heavy forces.

Besides the eight active Marine infantry regiments, there are three reserve Marine infantry regiments that fall under the Marines' reserve 4th Division. They are not considered in this comparison. As reserve units, they require additional time to mobilize and become combat effective. Similarly, the Navy will be able to use that same time to draw amphibious ships out of their reserve status should the DoD require a larger amphibious force. So this analysis does not consider the three reserve Marine regiments.

A Marine division fighting sustained combat operations normally fights with a tank battalion of 58 Abrams tanks and a light armored reconnaissance battalion of 110 LAVs.⁷⁰ Thus a Marine division carries 58 tanks with 120 mm main guns and 208 LAVs with 25 mm Bushmaster chain guns for a **total of 266 armored vehicles** with armor piercing capability. On the other hand, an Army armored division consists of 317 Abrams tanks with 120 mm main guns and 282 Bradley fighting vehicles with 25 mm Bushmaster chain guns for a **total of 599 armored vehicles** with armor piercing capability.⁷¹

The Marine LAV and the Bradley provide a similar degree of mobility.⁷² However, the two armored vehicles differ widely in protection. The LAV has “[a]rmor protection that defeats 7.62mm ball (Soviet short round) and 152mm fragments beyond 50 feet detonation.”⁷³ The M2A2 “Bradley can withstand projectiles up to 30-mm” on all sides.⁷⁴ In fact, “the armour of the M2 can defeat 95 per-cent of all types of ballistic attack encountered on the battlefield under [infantry fighting vehicle] doctrine.”⁷⁵ The Bradley’s armor protection is clearly superior to the armor protection of the LAV. Without question, the ground-based direct firepower and armored protection of an Army armored division decidedly outmatches that of a Marine division.

Even if the LAV matched the protection capabilities offered by the Bradley, the Marines do not normally employ the LAV in an infantry-carrying role to increase the mobility of the Marine infantry regiments. “The [Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR)] Battalion generally operates under the centralized control of the division for maximum effectiveness, although attachment of companies to infantry regiments is common.”⁷⁶ In addition, there are too few LAVs in a Marine division to carry all of the Marine infantry. The division’s LAR battalion has 110 LAVs—far too few to transport all of division’s infantrymen.⁷⁷ Since a division can move no faster than its slowest elements, the mobility of a Marine division in no way compares with that of an Army heavy division.

Even if air power and artillery are included in an analysis of Army and Marine combat power, an Army heavy division has a decided advantage in combat power. The Army heavy division is supported by Air Force close air support and air interdiction aircraft, organic divisional artillery with its multiple-launched rocket system, divisional and corps Apache attack helicopters, and supporting corps artillery brigades. While the Marine division is augmented with an air wing and division artillery, it has no comparable supporting corps artillery. Marine division artillery has only cannon, no MLRS.⁷⁸ Even though the Marines have fielded the Super Cobra attack helicopter, the Army’s Apache is decidedly superior. The Apache employs more effective weapon systems, has superior performance characteristics, is virtually all-weather capable, flies at greater speeds, and has greater armor protection than the Super Cobra.⁷⁹ In addition, the Apache can employ the millimeter wave radar in the Longbow configuration.⁸⁰ Without question, the Army heavy division outmatches the Marine division in terms of combat

power. Defending retention of a Marine division's worth of force structure as described above at the expense of a much more lethal Army heavy division makes little sense.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm offer a powerful example of how Marine force structure lacks sufficient combat power to conduct ground combat operations. During Desert Shield, to "bolster the coastal forces, Schwarzkopf attached the British 7th Armoured Brigade to the Marines, and for Desert Storm he replaced the British 'Desert Rats' with the Army's 'Tiger' Brigade, also equipped with the latest Abrams tanks."⁸¹ Schwarzkopf recognized the Marines' vulnerabilities: "The British [unit] had been aligned originally with the Marines to provide the armored punch necessary to protect the lightly armored and relatively immobile Marines from Iraqi armor."⁸² Major General Robert Scales, Jr. points out that "[t]he 'Tiger' Brigade with its newly issued M1A1s provided a Sunday punch for the more lightly equipped Marines."⁸³ This historical example also suggests that the MEF does not contain as much combat power as an Army heavy division and its corps slice. Further, the MEF does not contain sufficient combat power to conduct combat operations in an armored and mechanized environment.

While the foregoing analysis provides a strong argument for cutting a Marine division from the force structure before an Army heavy division, there are legal and political obstacles to be overcome. Title 10 of the U.S. Code may pose an obstacle to cutting a division's worth of Marine force structure. It prescribes that "[t]he Marine Corps...shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings." However, this section does not distinguish between active and reserve divisions.⁸⁴ Presently the Marine Corps consists of three active and one reserve divisions

and three active and one reserve air wings.⁸⁵ Thus the DoD may be able to reduce Marine Corps force structure to two active and one reserve divisions and two active and one reserve air wings without violating 10 U.S.C., § 5063.⁸⁶ Two Marine divisions can form around five regiments: one full division and one division minus. (The law does not define the internal structure of a division.) Of course, if a determination were made that this law provides for three active Marine divisions, then the DoD could request that the Congress change the law. In this era of severe budget austerity, no military force should be politically protected to the detriment of both national security and fiscal responsibility.

Even a top Marine officer strongly objects to further cuts in Army force structure. General John Sheehan recently observed that "There isn't any other service in the world that can do decisive combat other than the United States Army."⁸⁷ Interestingly, he "noted that the world's population is shifting toward coastal, urbanized areas, where 'boots on the ground' have more value than high-technology aircraft." He concluded that "[c]ombat in an urban area...requires tough infantrymen."⁸⁸ His observations may appear to offer more support for retaining light rather than heavy force structure. However, the extreme lethality of weapons systems in the hands of potential adversaries argue for armor protection. Americans are loathe to allow military leaders to expose America's youth to the effects of these lethal weapons unnecessarily. Recent deployments have been instructive in this matter.

After the tragedy in Somalia in October 1993, previously requested armored vehicles were immediately deployed there to provide greater force protection.⁸⁹ Operations in Haiti in September 1994 included the deployment of armored forces from the start.⁹⁰ Finally, the deployment of an armored division in Bosnia during Operation

Joint Endeavor offers the clearest recent example of how armored forces were viewed as necessary to provide protection in the event that the situation explodes in violence. Simply put, even though operations may occur more frequently in urbanized areas, military planners will include the deployment of armored forces to provide force protection. Additionally, unless it can be shown that the United States faces no reasonable combination of contingencies that requires the existing number of Army heavy divisions, the DoD should retain all six.

As suggested earlier, the BUR appears to contradict itself. Initially, it states that “the force structure adequate to execute the strategy...for a single MRC” includes 4 to 5 Army divisions and 4 to 5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades.⁹¹ Using this “building block” suggests that 8-10 Army divisions and the 8-10 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (three Marine divisions) are adequate for fighting two MRCs with coalition partners.⁹² However, under all four options, the BUR lists only five active MEBs.⁹³ This seems to suggest that the DoD recognized that the Marines would be able to rapidly project only five MEB equivalents (as discussed above).

If DoD determines that it should remove a Marine division from the force structure, it also may question whether it should cut an Army heavy division as well. The U.S. military strategy suggests that it should not. The BUR assessed four options. “Option 4 would allow us to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously while continuing to sustain some other overseas presence and perhaps an additional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other intervention-type operation. However, to maintain forces of this size would have required significant additional resources, thereby eliminating any ‘peace dividend’ the American people expected as a result of the end of

the Cold War.”⁹⁴ Notwithstanding the viability of “Option 4,” the BUR elected “Option 3,” “a force structure adequate to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.”⁹⁵ As stated above, even though “Option 3” included only five active Marine Expeditionary Brigades, DoD retained all three active Marine divisions.⁹⁶ Of the 13 active divisions (ten Army and three Marine), only six are heavy divisions, and they are not enough to provide the decisive force to fight two MRCs that the current National Military Strategy requires.

Operation Desert Storm offers a recent historical example of the need for heavy divisions. The U.S. divisions deployed to Southwest Asia included five heavy divisions, one air assault division, one airborne division, and two Marine divisions for a total of nine divisions.⁹⁷ Coalition partners brought an additional seven division equivalents for a grand total of 16 divisions.⁹⁸ Of these 16, 12 were heavy divisions.⁹⁹ The desert terrain is mostly unsuitable for light infantry and airborne division operations. In similar future operations with little forward-deployed American forces in Southwest Asia, the U.S. regional commander-in-chief (CINCENT) would most likely request the allocation of the air assault division and as many heavy divisions as can be provided. If a crisis situation were developing on the Korean peninsula, the BUR’s “MRC building block” suggests that the DoD would allocate the air assault division and only four heavy divisions to CINCENT, leaving two remaining heavy divisions: one deployed in Korea and the other stationed in the United States or Germany. Unless tensions on the Korean peninsula were to relax, generating the same number of heavy divisions today as used in Operation Desert Storm would be difficult. U.S. options could include the following three. First, the United States could persuade friendly nations to deploy more heavy force structure. Second, the United States could wait until reserve forces complete mobilization, deploy,

and are prepared to conduct sustained ground combat operations. Third, the United States could accept grave risk and commit a fifth heavy division to Southwest Asia while mobilizing reserve forces for possible deployment to Korea. Clearly, with six active heavy divisions, the United States already assumes greater risk today than it did in 1991, considering only the problems in Iraq and Korea. Were a second MRC to develop in Korea, the deployment of a fifth heavy division to Southwest Asia would leave the commander-in-chief of Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC) with only several active light divisions to reinforce the 2nd Infantry Division (Mech) and the ROK Army.

Contrary to popular belief, the CINC in Korea is unlikely to request light and airborne divisions over heavy divisions. CFC has numerous Republic of Korea (ROK) Army infantry divisions.¹⁰⁰ The heavy division gives the ground commander the ability to exploit tactical success in order to convert it rapidly into the achievement of operational objectives. Nevertheless, the need for light forces to provide force protection still exists. Also, the Korean peninsula is covered with difficult terrain on which light forces can more easily clear the ridge lines, thus permitting heavy forces to advance along valley roads. Although the air assault division would be useful in a Korean MRC, it is presumed to have been committed to the first MRC.

Since the U.S. military is more technologically advanced than the armed forces of its South Korean ally, U.S. heavy divisions bring technological advantages in protection, mobility, and fires to the battlefield. Thus U.S. forces would most likely be used in an exploitation role, so their advantages could assist in more rapidly concluding a war. If a second MRC were to develop on the Korean peninsula, then at most only two active Army heavy divisions could be made available for immediate employment. The United

States would most likely deploy the single remaining heavy division located in either Germany or the United States to Korea along with several enhanced separate brigades (ESBs).

Before addressing the concept of employing ESBs in order to strengthen the heavy forces of the CINC facing a second MRC, this study will address the readiness of their predecessors, roundout brigades. Prior to Operation Desert Storm, some CONUS-based divisions were assigned two active maneuver brigades.¹⁰¹ A National Guard brigade rounded out some CONUS-based divisions as their third ground maneuver brigades.¹⁰² Despite popular belief, these brigades were never expected by Army leaders to deploy immediately with their parent active division headquarters. “Peacetime planning called for the brigade to be a late-deploying unit in order to allow time for post-mobilization training to prepare for combat.”¹⁰³ The 39 training days per year allocated to these brigades were not enough to keep them ready for immediate deployment without post-mobilization training. Reserve units are also limited in other training resources. For example, reserve combat roundout brigades did not train at the National Training Center as often as active units.¹⁰⁴ Likewise, reserve combat roundout brigades did not benefit from Battlefield Command Training Program Warfighter Exercises as often as did active brigade headquarters.¹⁰⁵ Once mobilized for active duty, the roundout brigades required additional training to raise their proficiency to a level capable of conducting combat operations.

General Vuono, then Army chief of staff, understood this. He “insisted that the lives of young National Guardsmen not be placed at risk until they and their leaders had been exposed to the stresses of war in training to the same degree as regular units.”¹⁰⁶

The experiences during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm confirmed the above. The Congressional study, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War reported that “[t]he complex, collective combat skills required by the commanders, staffs, and soldiers of armor and mechanized infantry brigades are difficult to achieve by reserve component soldiers who receive limited training each year.”¹⁰⁷ In Certain Victory, General Scales observed that “skills such as these are best developed over many years of schooling, daily training, and practical application.”¹⁰⁸

The experience of mobilizing the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) provides an example. During post-mobilization training, this brigade’s proficiency significantly improved. However, the General Accounting Office reported that, even after post-mobilization training at the National Training Center, its “overall proficiency did not reach a level comparable to that of [an active duty brigade].”¹⁰⁹ The 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) was validated for deployment on 28 February 1991, ninety days after the reserve callup.¹¹⁰

Even though the Army never deployed any reserve armor or infantry units to the Gulf, some Marine reserve infantry and armor units fully participated.¹¹¹ Recognition of this difference between the two services led the Congress to provide remedial measures in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993.¹¹² It required the Army to assign 1,015 additional active duty officers to reserve units to assist them in the conduct of their training, much like the Marine Corps method for training and maintaining reserve readiness.¹¹³ However, the General Accounting Office reported to the Congress that “even if these initiatives are successful, there will still be some period

of post-mobilization training required before reserve combat brigades will be ready to go to war in the future.”¹¹⁴

It must also be noted that employment of Army and Marine reserve units is not the same. During the Gulf War, the Marines deployed no regimental (brigade) equivalents, only three battalion-sized and many smaller reserve units.¹¹⁵ The Marine Corps deployed two infantry battalions (3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines and 1st Battalion, 25th Marines) and one tank battalion (8th Tank Battalion).¹¹⁶ The 1st Marine Division tasked the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, as a special prisoner handling unit just prior to the start of ground operations.¹¹⁷ Before being assigned that task, the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, had secured the 1st Division’s rear area.¹¹⁸ Under 2nd Marine Division control, the reserve 8th Tank Battalion detached two of its three companies to infantry battalions in the 6th Marines.¹¹⁹ This arrangement left the reserve 8th Tank Battalion commander in charge of one tank company as the reserve for the 6th Marines.¹²⁰ Other deploying armor and infantry units included two tank companies from the 4th Tank Battalion and one company from the 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines.¹²¹ Even though the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, was attached to the 8th Marines and performed admirably, the reserve unit never performed as the regiment’s main effort.¹²² The reserve battalion “provided security in the Division’s zone forward of the berm,” secured the division’s and regiment’s flank, and served as the 8th Marine’s reserve.¹²³

The Marines can employ reserves (battalions and smaller units) in this manner for two reasons: first, a battalion commander and staff must achieve proficiency in fewer tasks compared to the number of tasks that a brigade commander and his staff must master. Second, the Marines have few reserve troops.¹²⁴ The Marines, therefore, can

break up their reserve infantry and artillery regiments and integrate the reserve battalions within the active organization without overwhelming the span of control of the active component units.

So, even though the Marines were able to successfully deploy reserve combat units, the Army cannot do this because of its large reserve structure, which is larger than the active component Army.¹²⁵ If the Army had employed the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) during Desert Storm, it would have been employed as a brigade much as it had trained with the 24th Infantry Division (Mech). Though an Army corps headquarters may have assigned the same missions to the 48th as were assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, the 48th most likely would not have been broken up and distributed in battalion-sized or smaller units for employment by active component brigade commanders.

Since Operation Desert Storm, the BUR presented the concept of designating reserve enhanced separate brigades (ESBs) to fight in the event the U.S. Army faced two nearly simultaneous MRCs.¹²⁶ Additional resourcing applied towards these units should enhance their readiness and enable them to deploy as more highly skilled and cohesive fighting units.¹²⁷ Though the ESBs may be able to develop greater cohesion than roundout brigades during pre-mobilization training, the ESBs still cannot match the degree of cohesion within active units. Reserve combat brigades are still limited in training resources and time. For example, the ESBs still do not train at the National Training Center as often as active units.¹²⁸ Likewise, ESBs do not benefit from Battlefield Command Training Program Warfighter Exercises as often as do active brigade headquarters.¹²⁹

Once mobilized for active duty, according to the U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1997, the Army still plans that the first three ESBs will require 90 days for training before deployment to a second MRC, the same period of time planned for the roundout brigades.¹³⁰ The determining factor appears to be the number of major training centers that can be employed to validate the heavy brigades. Given only three major training centers for heavy units (National Training Center, Fort Hood, and Yakima), the Army will likely validate no more than three heavy brigades as being ready-to-deploy within 90 days after the start of mobilization.¹³¹ Three more heavy brigades would become available for deployment after 45 more days (or a total of 135 days after the start of mobilization). And the final two heavy ESBs would be available no sooner than 180 days after mobilization began.¹³² A report from the General Accounting Office substantiates this finding. “One model...estimated that as many as 154 days could be required to prepare the brigades to deploy.”¹³³ Another model projects “that two or three of the better trained brigades could be ready to deploy in 102 days.”¹³⁴ Clearly, the Army’s plan to validate the National Guard ESBs prior to deployment for combat operations is consistent with the guidance issued by General Reimer, the Army’s current chief of staff, at a recent Association of the U.S. Army conference: “Our watch words continue to be that we send no soldier in harm’s way who is not trained for the mission.”¹³⁵

The argument may be made that the critical constraint regarding the deployment of the ESBs is not the three training centers mentioned above, but strategic transportation. Available strategic lift may be unable to cycle more than three heavy brigades along with supporting units to the second MRC more quickly than within 45 days. However, the

construction of 19 large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessels should greatly alleviate this problem.¹³⁶ In addition, if funds are appropriated by Congress to accept the recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study, an increase from 31 to 36 Ready Reserve Force roll-on roll-off ships would also help.¹³⁷ Over the long term, the primary limitation appears to be the validation of heavy ESBs through the limited number of maneuver training centers.

This analysis of the time required to validate reserve combat brigades is important to the CINC facing a developing second MRC. In Southwest Asia, U.S. coalition partners have few forces, and the United States has little forward presence. In the event a second MRC emerges in this region, the CINC may face great difficulty establishing a viable defense, much less beginning a counteroffensive, because of the unavailability of heavy forces. Continued attrition warfare would likely translate into greater casualties. The Korean War offers insight into the large number of casualties that fighting to a "stalemate" can generate. Even though the United States turned to a strategic defensive along the 38th Parallel, the U.S. Army sustained 45,637 casualties during the two years of attrition warfare between July 1951 to July 1953.¹³⁸

There is also the challenge of a more difficult span of control if two MRCs occur nearly simultaneously. As noted above, a CINC in a first MRC like Southwest Asia can most likely expect to receive four Army heavy divisions and the air assault division, a total of five divisions. Given two armored cavalry regiments (ACR), the 3rd ACR and the 2nd ACR (Light) in the Army, it appears likely that the CINC in Southwest Asia would also receive the more heavily armored 3rd ACR. This arrangement would leave a single heavy active division located in either CONUS or Germany. If a second MRC

were to emerge in Korea, then the 2nd Infantry Division (Mech) stationed in Korea and assigned to a Republic of Korea Army corps would likely fight under that ROK Army corps's control. According to the BUR, fighting two MRCs nearly simultaneously may also result in the employment of all 15 ESBs, eight heavy and seven light.¹³⁹ Even though some ESBs would likely deploy to the first MRC, the CINC in the second MRC could expect to receive the preponderance of ESBs. If only one corps headquarters is deployed to Korea, then the U.S. corps commander may find himself controlling one active heavy division, the remaining active ACR (2nd ACR (Light)), upwards of three light divisions, and the preponderance of 15 ESBs. In short, a single corps commander would be responsible for 13 to 20 maneuver units. Given four Army corps headquarters, however, it is likely that two U.S. army corps would deploy to Southwest Asia and two to Korea. In this case, each American corps commander in Korea may find himself controlling 6 to 10 maneuver units. If upwards of five ESBs were subsequently attached to the 5 active divisions, then this arrangement would leave 8 to 15 ground maneuver units. Thus two corps commanders would find themselves controlling between 4 and 8 maneuver units. In order to avoid unmanageable spans of control in a second MRC in Korea, the U.S. Army must deploy two corps, at least one ESB must be attached to each active division, and no more than 10 ESBs may conduct operations simultaneously controlled by the two U.S. corps. However, this arrangement causes light divisions to support heavy ESBs, thereby logically overstretching the light divisions' capabilities. Although subattaching ESBs to active divisions reduces operational span of control, the corps support command will likely have to support the subattached ESBs directly as well as the remaining ESBs not attached to active divisions. Similarly, the Corps major

subordinate commands would coordinate directly with the ESB support battalions. For example, the corps support command would coordinate directly with the forward support battalions of each ESB not attached to the active divisions. In any event, this arrangement would most likely result in unmanageable spans of control, which could severely complicate combat operations.

Besides span of control problems, ESB's are less technologically capable than their active counterparts. So the CINC would most likely need more time to reduce the enemy force to ensure better combat power ratios before starting the counteroffensive to achieve follow-on campaign objectives.

Finally, Army reserve combat brigades may be employed in secondary roles, much like Marine reserves in Operation Desert Storm, while active forces conduct decisive combat operations in the main effort. Reserve units may be able to perform missions including securing the rear area, handling enemy prisoners of war, or securing the flank. But in the event of a second MRC supported by the only two active heavy divisions available, the CINC is unlikely to have enough active combat brigades to conduct the main and supporting efforts. So he will not have the "luxury" of assigning less demanding missions to the reserve combat brigades. They will not have the time to develop unit cohesion while performing less critical missions like those performed by the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, during the Gulf War. Upon completion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), reserve combat brigades in a second MRC may have to fight as part of the main effort from the start.

Some may suggest that this analysis of ESBs argues for deploying National Guard divisions with their divisional command and control headquarters and support elements.

However, our power projection strategy may demand units trained and ready for the conduct of combat operations immediately. National Guard divisional headquarters are simply not able to deploy and employ the multiple battlefield operating systems (BOS) at the same level of proficiency as reserve combat brigades without even more training. The AirLand battlefield includes the management of 30 functions and activities, far more than the 20 handled by units in World War II and the 11 by units in World War I.¹⁴⁰ The multiplication of these battlefield functions also increases the complexity of operations.¹⁴¹ “With more than 30 battlefield functions now represented and the laws of friction and complexity in full operation, it is not farfetched to fear the danger of chaos—a disintegration of effort under the sheer weight of complexity.”¹⁴² Since the commander at each higher echelon must synchronize more functions than those handled by subordinate commanders, the commander at the higher echelon has far greater difficulty managing combat operations. Thus if the first three enhanced readiness brigades require 90 days to be validated for deployment, a reserve division headquarters will most likely require far more time before it is validated for deployment. A power-projection military should not have to wait for reserve division headquarters. A power-projection military force must have the capability to deploy and engage the enemy quickly. Otherwise, the strategy lacks credibility and thereby loses its power of deterrence.

Seeking to cut force structure somewhere in the DoD, some critics may suggest that an MRC in Southwest Asia requires only three heavy and one air assault divisions from the Army. For the purpose of analysis, let us accept this premise. Given the recent frequency of U.S. deployments to peacekeeping operations, it is certainly possible that two nearly simultaneous MRCs may develop during the execution of smaller scale

contingencies which could include the employment of a heavy division. A heavy division already deployed to a SSC would not be available to re-deploy to an MRC for some time. This unit would require additional training time to prepare for combat operations in an MRC. While the conduct of operations in a SSC may offer great training opportunities to medical, military police, and engineer soldiers and to staffs, these operations do not include the regular exercise of commanders and staff and the training of infantry, armor, and artillery in the conduct of sustained ground combat operations. Nor do these types of operations allow for combined arms training such as a deliberate breaching exercise. Operations in Bosnia offer a perfect example of an SSC. This operation is now scheduled to continue for a total of 30 months.¹⁴³

As long as the United States has a two nearly simultaneous MRC force sizing criterion, the U.S. military requires, at a minimum, six active Army heavy divisions. The CINC of Central Command (CINCENT) would most likely request the allocation of the air assault division and as many heavy divisions as can be allocated. The air assault division is a one of a kind division that offers the CINC a tremendous capability to fly deep into enemy territory, establish a base of operations, and inflict heavy damage on enemy logistical and artillery units. It complements but does not in anyway replace the capabilities of an Army heavy division.

But before reducing any force structure, Army or Marine, the DoD must ensure that it can achieve its ends with the proposed means. In other words, the DoD must ensure that it can fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs alongside coalition partners or one MRC unilaterally employing the reduced force structure without incurring unacceptable risks. Should the DoD determine that the United States could not fight two

MRCs alongside coalition members or a single MRC unilaterally without unacceptable risk, then the DoD should either preserve present force structure or adopt a new force-sizing criterion and stick with it. (Allowing Kim Il Sung and Stalin in January 1950 to learn that the U.S. “defensive perimeter” did not extend beyond the Ryukyu islands in the Pacific and then committing U.S. troops to defend the Republic of Korea in June 1950 is not “sticking with it.”)¹⁴⁴

Changing the force-sizing criterion may be unsound. If America is capable of fighting and winning only a single MRC, this may tempt a leader of a rogue nation to start a second, concurrent MRC. And even the threat of a second MRC may mute the U.S. response to the first. The United States may find itself unable to reassure or support its friends or honor a commitment to an alliance partner. Coalition partners in a second MRC scenario may be forced to accept losses until the United States is able to re-deploy decisive ground forces. Leaving American civilian leaders with too few American forces to commit to fight and win two MRCs could prove disastrous.

Finally, there is one overriding factor. As long as the United States maintains forward presence in a theater in which an MRC is most likely to develop, such as the Korean peninsula, then the United States must always ensure that it can fight and win two MRCs. Let’s assume for the moment that civilian leaders elect to cut the DoD’s force structure. In this case, should an MRC emerge off of the Korean peninsula while American forward presence continues in Korea, then the American soldiers in Korea may be placed in grave risk. Some might even say that their lives would be wagered. History provides an analogy: In July 1941 President Roosevelt, “against the advice of General George C. Marshall, War Department Chief of Staff, and Admiral Harold R. Stark, then

Chief of Naval Operations,” decided to deploy forces “to...reinforce the Philippines, though all War Department plans had assumed that the Philippines were indefensible.”¹⁴⁵ Americans remember all too well how the surviving soldiers from the defense of the Philippines endured the hardships of the Bataan “Death March” and the following years of brutal captivity. Before any decision is made to reduce America’s combat power for the conduct of sustained ground combat operations, we must honor our obligation to forward-deployed American soldiers. Before committing forces to an MRC that emerges outside of a theater in which U.S. forces are forward deployed, the DoD must ensure that it maintains the combat capability to reinforce the forward-deployed American soldier. This study concludes that cutting **any** of the Army’s six active heavy divisions would deprive DoD of the combat capability to reinforce forward-deployed American forces in Korea in the event of a second nearly simultaneous MRC on the peninsula. We simply cannot afford this risk.

In summary, it appears likely that civilian leaders may direct the elimination of a division from the military force structure even if they must overlook strenuous objections from senior military leaders. Recognizing a decreasing budget, the DoD must use strategy to drive force structure requirements such as determining which type of division to cut. The DoD should retain the organization that offers the best bang for the dollar, the unit that can conduct combat operations across the full spectrum of conflict. As stated before, Congressional funding (means) of the best mix of force structure (ways) enables the regional CINCs to achieve U.S. strategic objectives (ends). This study offers strong rationale for retaining the Army heavy division, ensuring the “best mix of force structure” (strategic ways). Thus if civilian leaders overrule senior military leaders to eliminate a

division, DoD should cut a Marine division. Compared with the Marine division that exceeds U.S. Naval amphibious lift capabilities and MPSRON shipping capacities, the Army heavy division can deploy just as rapidly. Compared to a Marine division with its MEF supporting forces, an Army heavy division with its supporting forces clearly provides the greater combat power in direct and indirect fires. In these times of diminishing discretionary tax dollars for defense spending, the DoD must objectively prioritize and retain force structure in order of combat capability irrespective of inter-service rivalry or political preference. As the United States begins to cut muscle out of force structure and possibly to assume ever greater risk, civilian leaders must be very careful to protect those units that offer the greatest combat power. After all, the faith must be kept with American forward-deployed forces. And they don't care in which service reinforcing troops serve as long as they arrive quickly with the most combat power.

¹ Rowan Scarborough, "Pentagon Eyes Cuts, Peacekeeping Focus: Army, Air Force May Suffer Most," The Washington Times, 13 December 1996, sec A, pp. 1, 14.

² Ibid., sec A, p. 14.

³ Bill Gertz, "General Predicts High Priority for U.S. Peacekeeping: Two-War Strategy May Be Changed," The Washington Times, 8 January 1997, p. A4.

⁴ Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (Washington, Department of Defense, October 1993), 13. This document shows that MRC means major regional conflict.

⁵ David Fulghum and Paul Mann, "Military Modernization Wins Budget Boost," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 September 1996, 28.

⁶ Wickham, John A., Jr., "An exclusive AFJ interview with: General John A. Wickham, Jr. Chief of Staff of the Army," interview by Millard Barger and Benjamin F. Schemmer, Armed Forces Journal International 123 (October 1985): 49. Force structure changes and equipment modernization, e.g., mobile subscriber equipment in the light division's signal battalion, may have caused the airlift requirement to rise above 500 C-141 plane loads.

⁷ Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-2 The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, (Washington, U.S. Marine Corps, 21 June 1991), 3-11.

⁸ Colonel Al Patterson, Chief of Aviation Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, interview by author, 31 March 1997, on the telephone between Washington, D.C. and Carlisle, PA. Fleet Marine Field Manual 6-1 Marine Division, Coordinating Draft, (Washington, U.S. Marine Corps, 21 July 1994), 1-1. Quick Reference Guide for U.S. Marines Serving in Joint & External Billets (Quantico, VA, Marine Corps University, 24 May 1996), paragraph "The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), unnumbered pages. In the first citation, COL Patterson stated that eliminating a three brigade light division would save \$695 million while the elimination of a three brigade heavy division would save \$1007 million. This is a difference in savings of \$312 million per year. This value is the difference in personnel manning costs for the divisions and their corps slice supporting elements, TDA for active and reserve soldiers, and (Transient, Trainees, Holding, and Students) TTHS savings. The difference in savings would be even greater if it included equipment and modernization, but that savings would be cost avoidance; thus, it is left out. The second citation states that the Marine Corps division includes 953 officers and 15394 enlisted for a total of 16,347, larger than the 10, 600 strong light division. The third citation states that the MEF ranges from 30,000 to 70,000. Using the average personnel cost of \$40,000 per troop provided by COL Patterson, the personnel savings for cutting a Marine division and its supporting forces in a minimum sized MEF equal \$1200 million dollars. This far exceeds the cost of a light division. Clearly, the elimination of a heavy division and its supporting units or a Marine division and its supporting units save more money than the elimination of a light division and its supporting units.

⁹ Historical Tables -- Budget of the United States Government -- Fiscal Year 1997 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997) 19-20. Jackie Calmes, "Budget Deficit Shrinks to Lowest Level in Two Decades, a Boon for Clinton," The Wall Street Journal, New York, 29 October 1996, sec A, p. 2. These two references show that from 1947 to 1996 there have been only eight years with balanced budgets.

¹⁰ Stephen Moore, "Budget Game Plan, Round 2," The Washington Times, 3 December 1996, p. A13. The table shows that entitlement spending, i.e., the categories Social Security and Health and Medicare, increased from 1950 to 1996 by 5,365% and 13,461%, respectively.

¹¹ "Medicare: The Clinton Legacy," editorial, The Washington Times, 11 November 1996, sec A, p. 20.

¹² Greg Groesch, "The Federal Dollar: Where the Federal Government Gets a Typical Dollar and Where It Goes," Box article, The Washington Times, 7 February 1997, sec A, p. 12.

¹³ Nancy E. Roman, "Republicans Look to Clinton to Make First Medicare Move," The Washington Times, 11 November 1996, sec A, p. 6. Nancy E. Roman, "Medicare Takes First Place As Campaign Issue," The Washington Times, 3 November 1996, sec A, p. 6.

¹⁴ Joyce Price, "Moynihan Asks for Changes in CPI," The Washington Times, 2 December 1996, sec A, p. 4. The consumer price index (CPI) is the annual inflationary adjustment given to recipients of Social Security income. Without the CPI, the elderly would eventually lose the value of their Social Security income over time.

¹⁵ Clay Chandler and Eric Pianin, "President Won't Back CPI Panel," The Washington Post, 13 March 1997, sec A, p. 1. Greg Pierce, comp., "Inside Politics: Both Barrels," The Washington Times, 10 March 1997, sec A, p. 6.

¹⁶ Paul Magnusson, "Sweeping the Medicare Mess under the Rug--Again," Business Week, 9 December 1996, 53.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Patrice Hill, "GOP: Clinton Budget Falls Short," The Washington Times, 7 February 1997, sec A, pp. 1, 12.

¹⁹ Eric R. Kingson and James H. Schulz, eds., Social Security in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 58.

²⁰ Ibid., 59.

²¹ Ibid., 51.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 51, 59.

²⁴ Ibid., 52, 53.

²⁵ Ibid., 54.

²⁶ "Hillary's New Strategy," editorial, The Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1996, sec. A, p. 20. Bill Styring, "How to Wean the Poor from Medicaid," The Wall Street Journal, 2 October 1996, sec. A, p. 18.

²⁷ Stewart Ugelow, "Clinton Signs Bill to Secure Health Benefits," The Wall Street Journal, 22 August 1996, sec. A, p. 16.

²⁸ Edward B. Atkeson, Maj. Gen. (Ret.), "The Threat From Washington," Army 46 (July 1996): 11.

²⁹ "Command and Staff," Army 39 (October 1989): 203 and 206 through 208. This directory shows 18 active divisions and 10 national guard divisions. "Command and Staff," Army 46 (October 1996): 198, 200, 205, 206, and 208. This directory shows 10 active divisions and 8 national guard divisions.

³⁰ James M. Dubik, Col., U.S. Army, "The New Logic The US Needs Capability-Based, Not Threat-Based, Military Forces," Armed Forces Journal International 134 (January 1997): 42-44. Ed. Mark S. Hoffman, "The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1990," Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1990, 786. Ed. Robert F. Famighetti, "The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997," K-III Reference Corporation, 1997, 179. These last two references show that the Army military strength in 1985 and 1996 was 776,244 and 493,330, respectively. This is a reduction in military strength of over 36%.

³¹ Robert F. Hahn, II, Major, "The Congressional Defense Department Competitive Strategy Making in the Post-Cold-War World," Airpower Journal, 9 (Special Edition 1995): 73. This document shows 24 active and 12 reserve wings in FY 90. Les Aspin, 30. Option three in this document shows 13 active and seven reserve wings.

³² Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, The Next War (Washington, Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1996), xv.

³³ Ed. Robert F. Famighetti, 179. This reference shows that the Marine military strength in 1990 was 195,652. "People," Marines 25, no. 1 (1996): 21. This reference shows that the Marine military strength 30 September 1995 was 174,639. This is a reduction in military strength of 11%.

³⁴ Ed. Mark S. Hoffman, 786-788. Ed. Robert F. Famighetti, 179. Marine strength in 1988 was 196,139, 9.2% of total strength of 2,125,854. By 1996, the Marines stood at 172,287, 11.6% of total strength of 1,491,625.

³⁵ Drury, Jill, Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management, Army Staff, March 7, 1997. Ms Drury stated that the base reduction action is expected to be completed by 2003, i.e., all BRAC actions are already completed.

³⁶ John G. Roos, "The Making of A Holy Grail," Armed Forces Journal International 134 (January 1997): 4.

³⁷ James M. Dubik, Col., U.S. Army, 42-44.

³⁸ Drury, Jill. Base closures and building demolition usually require upfront investment before savings are realized several years later. Other infrastructure savings, e.g., logistical efficiencies and privatizing, do not require large upfront investment in most cases.

³⁹ Drury, Jill. Base closures and building demolition usually require upfront investment before savings are realized several years later. Other infrastructure savings, e.g., logistical efficiencies and privatizing, do not require large upfront investment in most cases.

⁴⁰ Rick Maze, "Additional Base Closures Suggested in New Report," Army Times, 20 January 1997, p. 3.

⁴¹ David Silverberg, "BRAC Attack," Armed Forces Journal International 123 (March 1995): 40.
⁴² Ibid., 41.

⁴³ Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, § 2902 (c) (1) (1994). This citation shows that BRAC 95 is the latest authorized BRAC authorized in 1994. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1996, United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1996), vol. 1, 636-81. Military Construction Appropriations Act of 1996, United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1996), vol. 1, 283-91. These two Acts are the only two acts dealing with the department of defense, and both reveal no re-authorization for another BRAC round during FY 1996. Drury, Jill, Installation Planner, Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 March 1997. Since the last BRAC of 1995, the Congress has not yet authorized a new BRAC round.

⁴⁴ Goodman, Glenn W. Jr., "A Misbegotten Wretch," Armed Forces Journal International 123 (March 1995): 42.

⁴⁵ Caleb E. Baker, "The Disconnect between the Force and the Funding," Army 45 (February 1995): 36.

⁴⁶ Ellis D. Parker, (Don), Lt Gen (Ret.), "Why Army Modernization Is Vital to Our Future," Army 47 (March 1997): 15-17.

⁴⁷ Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., 42.

⁴⁸ Scott R. Gourley, "Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Modernization Realities," Army 45 (September 1995): 47.

⁴⁹ Dennis Steele, "Active Army Reduced to 10 Divisions," Army 45 (February 1995): 46-47. Field Manual 71-100 Division Operations (Washington, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 August 1996), 1-8. The 2nd Infantry Division is considered a heavy division. It actually has two of its five infantry battalions organized as air-assault-infantry-table-of-organization-and-equipment infantry battalions in lieu of two of a mechanized infantry division's normal complement of five mechanized battalions. This is suggested by FM 71-100 which states that the 2ID sets the pattern for the new medium division, the new National Guard division concept.

⁵⁰ Reference Text Forces/Capabilities Handbook Volume II Weapon Systems (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 13 September 1993), 4-9.

⁵¹ Ed., Foss, Christopher F., "Jane's Armour and Artillery," Jane's Information Group Inc., Alexandria, VA, 1995, 487.

⁵² Quick Reference Guide for U.S. Marines Serving in Joint & External Billets paragraph "The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), unnumbered pages. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, vol. 1, (Washington, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 26 June 1992), 19.

⁵³ Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 August 1996), 1-7 to 1-11.

⁵⁴ The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, 3-14.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 2-5. Kim Richards, Army War Reserve (AWR)-3/Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA), Information Paper, (Washington: Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, DALO-SMW, 9 December 1996), 1. The second reference shows the correct Army nomenclature for AWR-3/APA.

⁵⁷ The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense 3-10.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Corley, Army War Reserve Program, Information Paper, (Washington: Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, DALO-SMW, 15 November 1996), 2. This information paper lists all of the Army War Reserve packages and their locations such as AWR-2 in Europe.

⁶⁰ Quick Reference Guide for U.S. Marines Serving in Joint & External Billets, paragraph "The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), unnumbered pages.

⁶¹ Ed. Captain Richard Sharpe OBE RN, Jane's Fighting Ships, London, UK, 790. "Amphibious Lift," Marine Corps Headquarters slide (POE-B/429-02/AA/96), dated 1996.

⁶² "Amphibious Lift," Marine Corps Headquarters slide (POE-B/429-02/AA/96), dated 1996.

"Amphibious Lift," (POE-B/429-03/VM/95), dated 1995. These two slides show that the 36 ship fleet cannot lift more than 2.5 MEB equivalents with or without the addition of the projected seventh LHD and the projected upgrade to the LPD-17 San Antonio class. Quick Reference Guide for U.S. Marines Serving in Joint & External Billets paragraph "The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), unnumbered pages.

This reference shows that the term MEB is an outmoded term that describes a MAGTF formed around a Regimental Landing Team, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Brigade Service Support Group with only 30 days of supply. While the Marine Corps no longer uses the term "Marine Expeditionary Brigade" to describe an official Marine organization, the term "MEB equivalent" is still used to discuss the size of Marine unit that amphibious shipping can lift. The Marine Corps now uses the term "MEF (Fwd)." It is a stand-alone, "task organized MAGTF which is smaller than a full MEF...There is no set size of a deployed MEF Forward...A MEF (Forward) may be organized to look like a MEB, but not necessarily; therefore[,] it is erroneous to equate the two." Naval Warfare Publication 22-10 Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-5 Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, (Washington, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, September 1993), 28. This last reference states that "[a] Marine expeditionary brigade is a task organization that is normally built around a regimental landing team...."

⁶³ Ed. Captain Richard Sharpe OBE RN, 790. "Amphibious Lift," (POE-B/429-03/VM/95). Vincent Grimes, "LPD-17 Award," Naval Forces 17, no. 6 (1996): 40. The first reference shows that the current 36 amphibious ship fleet includes LSDs and the older LPD-4 Austin class. The second reference reports the award of the contract for construction of the newer LPD-17 San Antonio class. The third reference, the slide, shows that the current 36 ship fleet can lift only 2 MEB equivalents through 2003. Starting after 2003, the future 36 ship amphibious fleet lift capability will begin to exceed 2 MEB equivalents and will eventually reach a 2.5 MEB equivalent lift capability by 2009.

⁶⁴ "Amphibious Lift," (POE-B/429-02/AA/96), 1996. "Amphibious Lift," (POE-B/429-03/VM/95), 1995. Starting after 2003, the future 36 ship amphibious fleet lift capability will begin to exceed 2 MEB equivalents and will eventually reach a 2.5 MEB equivalent lift capability by FY 2009.

⁶⁵ Ed. Jean Labayle Couhat, Combat Fleets of the World 1986/87, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1986, 650-656. As of 1986, this source lists 55 amphibious ships not including the two LCCs with five additional ships to be activated by the summer of 1989. Ed. Robert F. Famighetti, 179. This reference shows that the Marine military strength in 1990 was 195,652. "People," 21. This reference shows that the Marine military strength 30 September 1995 was 174,639. This is a reduction in military strength of 11%, 21,000 Marines.

⁶⁶ Naval Warfare Publication 22-10 Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-5 Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, A-8. This reference shows that the Navy has three MPSRONs: 1, 2, and 3.

⁶⁷ "Organizations," Marines 25, no. 1 (1996): 7, 10. This citation shows that the 2nd 6th and 8th Marine infantry regiments are located at Camp Lejeune, the 1st and 5th Marine infantry regiments are at Camp Pendleton, the 7th Marine infantry regiment at Twentynine Palms, the 3rd Marine infantry regiment at Marine Corps Base in Hawaii, and the 4th Marine infantry regiment on Okinawa. The reserve Marine infantry regiments include the 23rd, 24th, and 25th Marines.

⁶⁸ Les Aspin, 30.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Reference Text Forces/Capabilities Handbook Volume I Organizations (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 14 September 1993), 4-6. "Heavy Mettle," Amphibious Warfare Review 11 (Winter/Spring 1993): 21-25. Quick Reference Guide for U.S. Marines Serving in Joint & External Billets paragraph "Marine Division Intelligence Assets," unnumbered pages. The Marine division includes three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, usually a tank battalion, an assault amphibian battalion, a combat engineer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, and an light armored reconnaissance battalion. Fleet Marine Field Manual 6-1 Marine Division, 1-5. The last reference shows 58 tanks in a Marine tank battalion.

⁷¹ Exercise Joint Warrior, Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course 97A (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 5 January 1997), 178.

⁷² Reference Text Forces/Capabilities Handbook Volume II Weapon Systems, 4-10. Field Manual 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley) (Washington, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 7 May 1993), B-2 and B-4.

⁷³ Reference Text Forces/Capabilities Handbook Volume II Weapon Systems, 4-10.

⁷⁴ Field Manual 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), B-2 and B-4.

⁷⁵ Ed., Foss, Christopher F., 454.

⁷⁶ Quick Reference Guide for U.S. Marines Serving in Joint & External Billets, paragraph "Marine Division Intelligence Assets," unnumbered pages.

⁷⁷ Reference Text Forces/Capabilities Handbook Volume I Organizations, 4-6.

- ⁷⁸ Major T. R. Snyder, "Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Support for the USMC," Information Paper, 1995/1996 Marine Corps Reference Papers (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 5 September 1995), 236.
- ⁷⁹ Ed. Paul Jackson, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, Jane's Information Group, Inc., Alexandria, VA, 1995, 491-2, 589, 590, 593.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., 590.
- ⁸¹ Robert Scales, Jr, Certain Victory (Washington, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), 96.
- ⁸² Ibid., 139.
- ⁸³ Ibid., 216.
- ⁸⁴ Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, § 5063 (a) (1994).
- ⁸⁵ "Organizations," Marines, 7-9.
- ⁸⁶ Associate Professor for Strategic Research Douglas Lovelace, Colonel, U.S. Army Ret., interview by author, February 1997, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁸⁷ Sean D. Naylor, "Sheehan: Technology Poor Substitute for Troops," Army Times, 24 Feb 1997, p. 16.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid.
- ⁸⁹ Louise Lief et al., "What Went Wrong in Somalia? False Premises, Bad Tactics, and a Lot More," U.S. News and World Report, 18 October 1993, 33-37.
- ⁹⁰ Dennis Steele, "The U.S. Army in Haiti," Army 115 (November 1994): 18.
- ⁹¹ Les Aspin, 19.
- ⁹² Ibid.
- ⁹³ Ibid., 29.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., 30.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., 29.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid., 19.
- ⁹⁷ Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Final Report to Congress (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1992), 257. The U.S. heavy divisions included the 1st and 24th IDs (Mech), the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division. The U.S. light divisions were the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Abn Division (Air Assault). The U.S. Marine divisions were the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid., 257-258, 267, and 512. Robert Scales, Jr, 103. The coalition heavy divisions were the 1st UK Armored Division , the 6th French Light Armored Division, the 3rd Egyptian ID (Mech), the 4th Egyptian Armored Division, and the 9th Syrian Armored Division for a total of five heavy divisions. A sixth heavy division-force equivalent (DFE), Task Force Khalid was a composite division including the 20th Saudi Infantry Bde (Mech) Royal Saudi Land Force (RSLF), the 4th Saudi Armored Bde (RSLF), and the 35th Kuwaiti Infantry Brigade (Mech), also known as the Shaheed Brigade. Three other coalition heavy brigades, equivalent to another heavy division, included the 7th Pakistani Armored Bde in Joint Forces Command-North and the 8th and 10th Saudi Infantry Brigades (Mech) in Joint Forces Command-East. Other brigades, such as the Kuwaiti Al-Fatah Brigade, may also have been heavy brigades; however, it is unclear if they were heavy brigades.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid., 257-258. The four divisions employed in Operation Desert Storm that were not heavy divisions included the following: the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and two Army, the 82nd Abn Division and the 101st Abn Division (AASLT).
- ¹⁰⁰ Defense White Paper 1992-1993 (Seoul, ROK, The Ministry of National Defense The Republic of Korea, 1993), 74. Table 2-4 "Military Capabilities of the South and the North," shows that the ROK Army has 49 divisions including the ROK Marine Corps divisions. With only 1700 armored vehicles, the ROK Army is clearly an infantry army. Assuming 425 armored vehicles per heavy division and 30 tanks for the infantry divisions most likely located along the armored avenues of approach (probably five divisions), the ROK Army has at most four heavy divisions. Thus the ROK Army has 44 infantry divisions.
- ¹⁰¹ U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, November 1992), 1.
- ¹⁰² Ibid.
- ¹⁰³ Robert Scales, Jr, 52.
- ¹⁰⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Miguel D. Laffosse, Combined Training Center Project Officer for Enhanced Separate Brigades, Unit Training Branch, Training Division, Operations Directorate, National Guard

Bureau at Arlington Hall, interview by author, 17 April 1997, on the telephone between Alexandria, VA and Carlisle, PA. LTC Laffosse stated that roundout brigades never received their own allocations outright. The 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) trained twice at the NTC using an unused active allocation. Only during Operation Desert Shield did the 48th Brigade train as a result of receiving its own allocation.

¹⁰⁵ Laffosse. LTC Laffosse stated that the roundout brigades trained every time their parent active division conducted a Warfighter Exercise.

¹⁰⁶ Robert Scales, Jr, 380.

¹⁰⁷ Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Final Report to Congress, H-14.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Scales, Jr, 380.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades, 2.

¹¹⁰ Robert Scales, Jr, 52, 53, 393. The DoD did not call up the 48th Brigade until late into Operation Desert Shield. However, this was due to the restrictive nature of the reserve callup system that has since been remedied by the Congress. According to Title 10, the President could not callup the 48th Brigade for more than 90 days, and then could only extend that activation for 90 more days. Since peacetime planning called for 90 days of post-mobilization training, the Brigade would spend less than 90 days in Southwest Asia before re-deploying for the United States. "Congress granted authority for the combat units to be called up for one year on 30 November, and the Army activated the 48th Brigade."

¹¹¹ Lieutenant Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 with the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), 4. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Final Report to Congress, H-14.

¹¹² National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1992), vol. 3, 961.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades, 3.

¹¹⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 4. Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 with the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), 4.

¹¹⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 4, 91.

¹¹⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 19.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 27.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., 38, 40, 54, 56, 67.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ "People," Marines 21. This reference shows that the Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units total 33,541 compared to an active duty strength of 174,639. Les Aspin, 93. This reference shows that Marine reserve troops constitute only 19% of total Marine Corps end-strength.

¹²⁵ Togo D. West, Jr. and Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 97, Posture Statement presented to the 104th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996), 41-42. This reference shows that the combined strength of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard at the end of FY 95 exceeded the strength of the active Army. It also projected that this relationship remains the same through FY 98.

¹²⁶ Les Aspin, 30, 93, 94.

¹²⁷ Togo D. West, Jr. and Dennis J. Reimer, A-11. Colonel Ronald Henley, former Brigade S-3, 81st Infantry Brigade (Mech) (ESB), interview by author, 20 April 1997, Carlisle, PA. Laffosse. The first reference shows that ESBs receive enhanced annual training, and this enhanced annual training should translate into higher pre-mobilization readiness levels, which should mean better and faster post-mobilization training. In fact, the first reference states that this should be the equivalent of 14 to 21 days of additional training time. In the second reference, COL Henley explained that one example of enhanced

annual training includes the assistance offered by the active component Regional Training Brigades (RTBs) and Regional Training Detachments (RTDs). An RTD consisting of active component officers and NCOs is assigned to each ESB. They assist and advise in the training and operations of the brigade. The RTB supports collective training. For example, the RTBs set up and assist in running situational training exercise (STX) lanes and weapons ranges and provide readiness feed back. This arrangement allow ESB leadership and staffs to focus more on staff development and operational proficiencies at the battalion and brigade levels. Thus this should reduce the time necessary to prepare the unit starting battalion and brigade task force operational training at one of the three heavy force mobilization training sites for unit validation. In the last reference, LTC Laffosse stated that overall the ESBs are resourced at a higher level than the former roundout brigades. For example, ESBs receive allocations at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center, receive Team Charlie Evaluations from Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, are better funded than were the roundout brigades, are authorized for overstructure at better than 100%, receive higher priority for annual training ammunition expenditure, and modernize at a faster rate.

¹²⁸ Laffosse. LTC Laffosse stated that the eight heavy ESBs will cycle through the National Training once every eight years. The National Guard receives only one allocation per year for the heavy ESBs.

¹²⁹ Laffosse. LTC Laffosse stated that the eight heavy ESBs cycle through a Battle Command and Training Program Warfighter Exercise about once every three years on average.

¹³⁰ Togo D. West, Jr. and Dennis J. Reimer, A-11. Robert Scales, Jr, 52. The first reference shows that the Army plans for 90 days before the first three heavy ESBs are validated for deployment. The second reference shows that this is the same period of time as it was for the roundout brigades.

¹³¹ Togo D. West, Jr. and Dennis J. Reimer, A-11, A-12.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ U.S. General Accounting Office, Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain, 3.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹³⁵ General Dennis Reimer, AUSA Conference, Washington, October 1996.

¹³⁶ Togo D. West, Jr. and Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 98, Posture Statement presented to the 105th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1997), 15.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Office of the Adjutant General's Statistical and Accounting Branch, Battle Casualties of the Army (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General's Statistical and Accounting Branch, 30 September 1954), 3-7.

¹³⁹ Department of the Army, America's Army—Enhanced Brigades, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, n.d.), Prologue. This pamphlet shows that there are 15 enhanced brigades.

¹⁴⁰ General William E. Depuy, "Concepts of Operation: The Heart of Command, the Tool of Doctrine," Army 38 (August 1988), 28-29.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 28.

¹⁴² Ibid., 29.

¹⁴³ Paul Bedard and Bill Gertz, "Clinton to Keep U.S. Troops in Bosnia into '98," The Washington Times, 16 November 1996, sec A, pp. 1, 6.

¹⁴⁴ T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1963), 52, 53. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York, Times Books, 1982), 30.

¹⁴⁵ Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1963), 53.

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